Michigan Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 6

1962

Civil Aeronautics Act-Discrimination-Private Cause of Action for
Punitive Damages
L. B. Hirsch
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Torts
Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
L. B. Hirsch, Civil Aeronautics Act-Discrimination-Private Cause of Action for Punitive Damages, 60 MICH.
L. REV. 798 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss6/6

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL .AERONAUTICS Acr-DisCRIMINATION-PRivATE CAUSE OF Acr10N
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES-Plaintiff held a reconfirmed tourist reservation
on one of defendant's St. Louis-to-Los Angeles flights. Defendant oversold
the flight and subsequently "bumped" the plaintiff from the flight in
favor of a first-class passenger who was given plaintiff's accommodations in
the tourist section. Defendant's agent booked a reservation for the
plaintiff aboard another airline and provided plaintiff with lunch. The
only expense incurred by the plaintiff as a result of being removed from defendant's flight was the cost of a telephone call to inform his wife of his new
arrival time; and plaintiff was inconvenienced by a delay of four hours on a
Sunday in his arrival in Los Angeles. Plaintiff instituted suit in federal district court for actual and punitive damages alleging the violation of a federal criminal statute.1 Held, judgment for plaintiff for the cost of the
telephone call as compensatory damages and for five thousand dollars
as exemplary damages. Defendant unjustly discriminated against plaintiff
in violation of section 404 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act2 by giving
flight priority to passengers who had booked reservations subsequent to
plaintiff's booking. This violation of a federal criminal statute creates
an implied federal cause of action in favor of the plaintiff for both
actual and punitive damages. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
Where a federal criminal statute does not expressly create a civil
remedy, the federal courts have frequently implied such a federal cause
of action, provided that the injured party belongs to the specific class
for whose benefit the statute was passed.3 Although the federal courts have
never clearly explained the basis for their jurisdiction in such cases, it has
been suggested that "federal courts have the power to afford all remedies
necessary to the vindication of federal substantive rights defined in
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 784, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1958).
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1958) provides:
"No air carrier ••. shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person . • • in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person . • • to any unjust discrimination or any
undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
3 See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Federal Safety Appliance
Acts of 1893); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1947) (Communications Act of 1934); Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (Air Commerce Act of 1926). But see MontanaDakota Util. Co. v. Northwestem Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (Federal Power
Act); Daly v. WBLN Television, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. III. 1962) (Communications
Act of 1934). Statutory interpretation may lead to the conclusion that Congress did
not intend such a remedy to be implied. See T .I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359
U.S. 464 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935).
1
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5tatutory [provisions] ...." 4 Thus, in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 5 the Second Circuit held that the Civil Aeronautics Act
provided an implied federal cause of action in behalf of interstate air
carrier passengers who were discriminated against in violation of section
404 (b) of the act. 'While the Fitzgerald court spoke of the plaintiff's
right •to reparation, the exact nature of the damages to which she was
entitled was not described. However, the federal courts have uniformly
spoken in -terms of compensation for actual damages suffered by the
injured party when implying a federal cause of action from a criminal
statute.6 Thus, the significance of the principal case lies in the court's
determination that punitive as well as actual damages may be awarded
to persons mjured by a violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
The federal courts have held punitive damages to be justified when
a tortious act is accompanied by some aggravating factor. 7 The courts
have further held that such an aggravating factor exists when a carrier
wantonly disregards its public duty. 8 Prior to the principal case, however,
there does not seem to be a single case allowing punitive damages incident
to a federal cause of action implied from a criminal statute.9 Nevertheless,
the court in the principal case felt that the defendant's practice of
deliberately overselling passenger space on many of its flights constituted
a wanton disregard of its public duty which justified punitive damages.10
The domestic airlines' long-standing practice of overselling11 is directly
tied to the problem of the "no-show," i.e., a ticket holder who fails to
notify the airlines that he does not intend to make use of his reservation,
thereby making impossible the resale of the seat reserved for him.12 Faced
4 Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such
Remedy, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1094 (1948).
r, 221> F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
6 The rationale for this implication is that where a party suffers injury due to
the violation of a federal statute, Congress would desire the parties for whose benefit
the statute was passed to have the means to be made whole. See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
7 See Lake Shore &: Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Milwaukee &: St.
P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875); Atkinson v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 143 F.2d 477
(5th Cir. 1944); Cowen v. Winters, 96 Fed. 929 (6th Cir. 1899).
8 See Lake Shore &: Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, supra note 7; Milwaukee &: St. P. Ry.
v. Arms, supra note 7; Cowen v. ·winters, supra note 7.
9 Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), a case on which the principal case relied, would seem to be distinguishable as
the statutory remedy provided in Hague was a substitute for a common-law tort remedy which had allowed punitive damages. See 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1958).
The presence in the principal case of an administrative agency with primary jurisdiction
also distinguishes it from the Hague case. See text infra.
10 Principal case at 367-68.
11 See Aviation Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38; Aviation Week, June 11, 1956, p. 38.
The CAB reported evidence of 33,000 individual cases of "oversales" in 1960. See
Aviation Weck, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 45.
12 "No shows" have been estimated to constitute 16% to 18% of the total airline
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with the prospect of lost revenue resulting from empty seats on flights for
which there is excess demand, many airlines attempt to calculate the
potential number of "no shows" on a specific flight and compensate
for this by overselling. This practice tends to defeat itself by encouraging
multiple bookings by passengers because of the fear of being "bumped,"
leading to an increase in "no shows," and making necessary greater
overselling-thus ultimately increasing the possibility of error in determining the potential number of "no shows" for specific flight. 13 The
basic objection to this approach is that it attempts to solve the "no
show" problem by inconveniencing the innocent ticketholder while the
cause of the problem, the "no show," is in no way deterred or punished.14 The passenger's difficulty in proving sufficient damages to make
a law suit worthwhile and the failure of the Civil Aeronautics Board to
take appropriate steps to enjoin oversales15 has allowed the airlines to
continue this practice at the expense of their passengers with relative
impunity.16 Viewed against this background, it is hardly surprising that
a court would desire to give relief to the long-suffering air passenger.
It seems clear, therefore, that the court, in awarding puni,tive damages, was
attempting to deter future misconduct in this respect by the airlines,17
and to force ,the airlines and CAB to seek means less objectionable than
overselling to solve the critical "no show" problem.
There is, however, a significant question as to whether the court
possessed the power to grant such a remedy. First, where Congress has
set out a criminal statute as a method of punishment and deterrence,
it is difficult to infer that punitive damages were also intended to be
passengers boarded. See Aviation Week, July 9, 1956, p. 38; Aviation Week, April 2,
1956, p. 21.
13 See Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960); Aviation Week,
April 2, 1956, p. 21.
14 The airlines have attempted at three different times since the end of World War
II to discourage "no shows" by imposing fines upon them. The last plan to be used
succeeded in reducing "no shows" by 61 % after its adoption in 1956. The plan was
discontinued in 1958, over the objections of the great majority of airlines, due to the
insistence of American Airlines, which argued that the increased capacity of the airlines
and the cost of administration made the plan unnecessary as well as uneconomical. Despite their objections, the other airlines, due to competitive pressure, followed American's lead. See Aviation Week, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 40; Aviation Week, July
21, 1958, p. 29; Aviation Week, May 26, 1958, p. 39.
15 The CAB as early as 1956 threatened action against the airlines if they continued
to oversell, but effective action was not taken. Aviation Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38.
13 Free passage and cash payments were given in some cases to pacify angry victims
of "oversales." Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960); Aviation
Week, July 23, 1956, p. 38.
17 Principal case at 367. The court, in justifying punitive damages, talks also of
the vindication of the plaintiff's rights as a passenger, but the negligible amount of
inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff would seem to indicate that this was secondary
to the court's desire to protect future air passengers from "overselling."
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used for these purposes. Secondly, the court is faced with the even more
serious problem of the primary jurisdiction of the CAB. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction provides that when Congress creates an administrative agency to regulate a particular area of endeavor, state and federal
courts are without jurisdiction or power to grant relief to any person
complaining of any act done, if the nature of the act brings it within
the sphere of regulation of the agency, until such time as the complaining
party has exhausted his remedies before the administrative agency.18
The court in the Fitzgerald oase was careful to point out that since the
plaintiff was suing on the basis of past injuries, recourse to the CAB
was unnecessary as the Board had no power -to grant damages for such
injuries. The CAB does, however, have the power to punish parties for
violations of the Civil Aeronautics Act. 19 It further possesses the power to
enjoin future violations of the act for ilie purpose of protecting the
general public.20 The court, by attempting to deter future violations of
the act, seemingly usurped the CAB's regulatory function and thus interfered with ·the primary jurisdiction of the Board.21 It would seem, therefore, that the court overreached its own jurisdictional power in order to
provide the mistreated air passenger with a sorely needed remedy.22
L. B. Hirsch
See Adler v. Chicago &: So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
Section 902(a), 72 Stat. 784 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1958) provides: "Any person
who knowingly and willingly violates any provisions of this Act ••. shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be subject for the first
offense to a fine of not more than $500, and for any subsequent offense to a fine of
not more than $2000."
20 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1958, § 1002(c), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. § 1482{c) (1958)
provides: "If . . . any person has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter
or any requirement established pursuant thereto, the Administrator or the Board shall
issue an appropriate order to compel such person to comply therewith."
21 Cf. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951); Adler v. Chicago
&: So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
22 Subsequent to this decision the CAB adopted rules whereby the airlines must
pay to a passenger "bumped" because of an "oversale" five dollars or fifty percent of
the one-way fare of the first remaining validated flight coupon, whichever is greater,
but with a maximum charge of forty dollars. In return, the airlines may penalize "no
shows" under the same formula. See Domestic Trunkline Carriers, IA Av. L. REP. 21,
258 (CAB March 1, 1962). The federal courts have held that rules approved by the
CAB, limiting the airlines• liability, become part of the passenger's contract and the
federal courts will not extend jurisdiction to claims arising under such rules. These
decisions indicate that if a suit similar to the principal case were now instituted, the
court would dismiss the case in recognition of the CAB's primary jurisdiction. Lichten
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Toepfer, Inc. v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Wittenberg v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 459 (E.D. S.C. 1954); Mach v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass.
1949).
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